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The Efficiency Gains from Dynamic Tax Reform
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new simulation methodology for determining
the pure efficiency gains from tax reform along the general equilibrium
rational expectations growth path of life cycle economies.
The principal findings concern the effects of switching from apro-
portional income tax with rates similar to those in the U.S. to either a
proportional tax on consumption or a proportional tax on labor income.
A switch to consumption taxation generates a sustainable welfaregain of
almost 2 percent of lifetime resources. In contrast, a transition to
wage taxation generates a loss of greater than 2 percent of lifetime re-
sources.
A secondgeneral result is that even a mild degree of progressivity
in theincome tax system imposes a very large efficiency cost.
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(617) 495—3934 (203) 436—1937 (804) 924—3178The efficiency gains from dynamic tax reform are the object of increasing
interest among academic economists and economic policy maaers. kecent research
byFeldstein (19'Tb), Summers (19o1), and Chamley (l9dl) has greatly increased
understanding of this issue by examining respectively the efficiency costs of
proportional tax structures in partial equilibrium, in steady state general
equiliorium, and, for the case of infinitehorizon households, along the
econoor's general equilibrium transition path. This paper presents a new simu-
lation methodolo,r for determining the pure efficiency gains from tax reform
along the general equilibrium rational expectations growth path of life cycle
economies. Thesimulationmodel measures the efficiency gains from changes in
the deree of progressivity of tax structures as well as changes in the tax
base. It also distinguishes pure pareto efficiency gains from the welfare
changes arising from simple economic redistribution among generations.
The principal findings of this study concern the effects of switching froti a
proportional income tax with average rates similar to those in the U.S. to
either a proportional tax on consumption or a proportional tax on labor incoie.
Given our assumptions about production technoloy and individual preferences, a
switch to consumption taxation generates an efficiency gain sufficient to
improve the welfare of all future generations by almost 2percent of lifetin
resources.This result is not greatly influenced by reasonable chanbes in para—
meters of the utility and production functions. In contrast, a transition from
an income tax to a wage tax generates an efficiency loss greater than 2 percent
of lifetime resources for the same set of parameter values, however, this number—2—
varies substantially for moderate changes in preference parameters.
For a constant level of revenues, the consumption tax combines a one—time,
nonclistortionary lump sum tax with a wage tax. Since a wage tax itself is
distortionary, it is natural to expect the consumption tax to be more efficient.
It is this element of lump—sum taxation, and not the exemption from taxation of
capital income se that is crucial to the achievement of efficient tax
ref orm)-
A second general result is that even a mild degree of progressivity in the
income tax system (as measured by the steeriess of the marbinal rate schedule)
imposes a very lare efficiency cost. For example, in comparison with an equal
revenue proportional income tax, a progressive income tax with average tax rates
var.ing over the life cycle between .23 and .32 and mar6inal rates ranbinb from
.23 to •L3 imposes an efficiency cost greater than 6percentof fuil liietiiae
resources.
Section I of this paper reviews selections from the voluminous literature on
optimal taxation that are most relevant to the present analysis. section II
describes the basic simulation model. The model, which incororates variable
labor supply and endogenous retirement behavior, is a more elaborate version of
the Auerbach—Kotlikoff (19d1) simulation model. Section III describes the maxi—
mm method of welfare analysis that permits one to distinguish economic effi-
ciency from redistribution. The model and maxi—min technique are used in
Section III to determine the efficiency gains from switching from a proportional
income taxtoproportional consumption and wage taxes. Section IV examines the—3—
sensitivityof section Ill's results to changes in the static and intertemporal
elasticities of substitution in consumption and leisure demand as well as the
elasticity of substitution in production. A similar analysis of the progressive
tax is conducted in Section V, this section considers both chanues in the debree
of pro,ressivity of the income tax as well as chanbes in the progressive tax
base either to consumption or wae,es. The final. section discusses some of the
implications of this paper for current tax policy.—4—
I.Selected Literature Review
Measurement of the efficiency aspects of tax structures dates at least from
the development of a consumers' surplus measure of excess burden by Hotelling
(193d) and the refinement of this approach by Harberber (196). Today, there
is a large body of literature dealin with issues of welfare measurement; this
literature is concerned with the appropriate measure of excess burden (Diamond
and McFadden 191, Kay 1980, Auerbach and Rosen 1900, and Hausman 1981a) as well
as methods of approximatin its magnitude (Green and Sheshiriski 1919).
An outbrowth of this interest in measurin the efficiency of alternative tax
structures was the renewed examination of Ramsey's (l97) optimal tax problem
(Baumol and Bradford 1910) and its extension to the question of the optimal
structure of proportional commodit taxes Hiven a restrictea set of polic
instruments (see, for example, Diaiaonu and ivlirrlees 191L,Stbl1tZand Dasupta
1911, and Atkinson and Stern 1914).
Both the measurement of excess burden and the calculation of optimal tax
schedules have been extended to the interternporal issues surrounding the taxa—
tion of capital income. Feldstein (1910) presents efficiency calculations based
on a two—period model in which an individual supplies labor in the first period
and consumes in both periods. Feldstein concludes that a proportional tax on
labor income is significantly more efficient than a proportional income tax.
While instructive, Feldstein's analysis ignores general ec1uilibrium changes in
prices due to changes in factor supplies and uses Harberger's (1964) local
approximation formula to measure the efficiency effects of large tax rate—5—
changes(Green and Sheshinski 1919). The single period of labor supply also
raises problems. Summers (19l) demonstrates that uncompensated labor supply
elasticitieswith respect to the net return to capital are markedlydifferent
for rmilti—period models than for one period labor supply models. The same point
pertains to those compensated labor supply elasticities relevant for excess bur-
den calculations. A final issue is the sensitivity of Feldstein's conclusion to
the particular choice of preference parameters (Kin l9dO).
In studyin5 the taxation of savins, an alternative to the static, two—
period model is the dynamic,two—periodmodel introduced by Diamond (19b).
Papers by Auerbach (1919) and Atkinson and Bandmo (l9bo) characterize tax
structures that maximize the utility of individuals in the steady state of such
an econort,r. While derived from the general equilibrium model, these results are
still based on the simple two—period model of individual behavior with a single
labor supply decision. Moreover, for purposes of analytical tractability, these
papers ignore the effect of the tax structure onthe welfare of earlier genera-
tions aliveduring the econoxiy's transition to its steady state. Determination
ofthe tax schedule that maximizes steady state utility is a quite different
exercisefrom the standard optimal tax problem of minimizing excess burden; it
is possible to improve the utility of steady state generations by switching from
one efficient tax system to another by imposin5 a greater fraction of the
econonr's lon—run tax burden on earlier, pre—steaa state generations.
Witha numerical simulation mode', line that developed by Miller
and Upton (i9ui4), Summers (191) compares steady state utility for a
model with fixed labor supply, but a more realistic, multi—period descrip-
tion of life—cycle consumption behavior; his study also attempts to—6—
measurethe efficiency consequences of an explicit transition from one tax
system to another. His analysis demonstrates that proportional wae and con-
sumption taxes with equal annual revenue have markedly different long run
impacts despite the fact thatthe structure of these two tax systems in the long
runare identical in the sense that neither imposes a distortion on intertem—
poral choicesThe common assumption of steaay state models that the
government's budget be balanced at each instant implies a quite different inter—
cohort distribution of the tax burden of financine government expenditures under
the wage tax versus the consumption tax. While long—run tax structures are
identical under the two tax systems, the inter—cohort distribution of the
econoirw's tax burden is not2.
Summers' transition analysis, however, like that found in the earlier work
of Miller and Upton, is based on the assuxaption of copic rather than rational
expectations; it also assumes completely inelastic supplies of labor. The
exclusion of variable labor supply in an analysis that purorts to compare the
efficiency of capital income taxation with consumption or wage taxation is an
obvious shortcoming: the assumption of rropic expectations is also undesirable.
The transition paths of nopic life cycle economies are likely to differ sie,ni—
ficantly from perfect foresiht rational expectations paths.
These advances in the measurement of dynamic tax efficiency would, of
course,be inconsequential if economic theory alone could provide a clear guide
toefficient, dynamic taxstructures. Unfortunately, theory provides little
guidance for the choice of tax base even in static settings. Even in the simple—7—
staticcase where the welfare of a sinLe generation alive for two periods with
noinitial endowment is considered, a particular arument advanced by Feldstein
(1975) and others in favor of a zero tax on capital income no lonber applies if
leisure is a choice variable in the second period. As shown by Sancimo(i97L),
if utility is separable into the untaxed nuniaire good and a homoenous function
of all other commodities, uniform taxation of these commodities is optimal3. If
the untaxed good is labor, and the remaining commodities are first and second
period consumption, then Sandino's conditions are met. The optimal tax structure
is a pure consumption tax or, equivalently, a labor income tax. However, if a
fourth taxable commodity, second period labor, is added, separability of the
uti1it function into goods and leisure and homogeneity with respect to consunip—
tion is no loner sufficient to insure the optimality of the pure consumption
tax. In fact, in thiscase, a proportional incohie tax may be less distor—
tionarythan a proortional consumption tax. Given the failure of economic
theoryto guidethechoice of an efficient tax base, let alone the choice of
efficient dynamictaxrates, the efficiency properties of alternative tax struc-
turesremain a suitaole obect for study throuh numerical simulation.—8-.
II.The Basic Model and Its Solution
The basic model extends the Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981) life cycle sirr1a—
tion model by incorporatin5 endoenous labor supply and retirement and by per—
mittin the production technoloey to differ from a simpleCobb—Douglas
specification. The model describes the evolution over time of an econoxr con—
sistin of government, household, and production sectors. The household sector
r,f f-i ft.v'.r rrIn- nrti n' rfnrI 'ri lii rPh,.fir_.fire
periodlife spanis intended to correspond roughly to the life span ofanadult,
that is, the years between ages twenty and seventy—five. In each generation,
there is a single, representative individual, and individuals in different
generations differ only with respect to their opportunity sets.5 The population
as a whole grows at a fixed rate n (assumed to equal .01 throughout the paper).
The Household Sector
Each household is a self—contained unit, enbaein in life—cycle consumption
and labor supplybehaviorwith no bequests. The lifetime utility of each house-
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where L and Ctarethe household's leisure (out of a unit labor endowment) and
consumption at the end of year t, and 5, a, and yaretaste parameters. A large—9—
value of 5. the household's pure rate of time preference, indicates that the
individual will consume a greater fraction of lifetime resources in the early
years of life. The term cx is the intensity parameter of leisure. Given prices,
a larger value of a would lead to a greater fraction of full resources being
spent on leisure.The terms p and y are the household's elasticities of
substitutionbetween consumption and leisure in a given period and between con-
sumption (or leisure) in different periods, respectively. Thouh this is an
extremely general utility function, it does impose certain constraints on
preferences, such as equal interteinporal substitutability of consumption and
leisure.
The individual maximizes lifetime utility (1) sub.ject to a budet con-
straint, the exact specification of which depends on the particular tax system
in force. For a progressive income tax, the lifetime budget constraint is:
55t — — 55t — (2) {ir(l+rs(1_rys))}l(1_tyt)wtet(1)> {(l+r(l-))}lct t=l s=2 t=l s=2
where r5 is the gross interest rate in period s, wt is the gross wage rate (in
output units) in period t, and Tyt is the average tax rate on income faced by
the household in year t. The et terms are included to reflect the accumulation
of human capital, these terms describe how many units of "standard" labor the
household supplies per unit of leisure foregone in any given year. Thus,
wtet may by interpreted as the individual's gross wae rate. The human caital—10—
profile e (the shape of which is discussed below) is the same for all house-
holds, and labor supplied by different benerations, after adustment for
efficiency, is hoxnoenous.
In addition to this overall budet constraint, we impose the requirement
that labor supply can never be neative, i.e., if the notional deiaand for
leisure, 9.,exceedsone, the individual must "retire" for that period, supplin
zero labor. This is represented by the inequality constraints:
(3) £t<1forailt
Construction of a Ladranian from expressions (1), (2), and (3), and dif-
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is the marginal income tax rate in the year t, and i. is the imiltiplier of
the period t labor supply constraint.
With progressive taxes, O is less tYian one, and represents a reduction in
the implicit price of year t consumption or leisure. This additional term
reflects the fact that an increase in current consumption or leisure will reduce
savings and, hence, income from assets in all future years, thus reducing all
future averae tax rates. The "effective wabe" wt* equals the net rnarinal wae
per unit of leisure foregone when Pt=O. Whenidiffers from zero, no labor is
supplied and the individual is "retired." In this case, Wt* is the "shadow" or
"reservation' wage at which the household would freely choose to supply zero
labor.
Combination of conditions (1a) and (nb) yields:
w* _p
(8) £.t=—k) Ct
Substitution of (8)into(5)providesan expression for in terms of Ct, given
thisformila, (4a) yields the "transition equation":






Theinterpretation of (9) is complicated by the presence of the term V/ t—i
that involves the effective waes in the two perious. Since the derivative
of with respect to the efrective wae wt* has the same sibn as the
effect of the slope of the wae profile on the slope of the consumption profie
depends on whether the elasticity of substitution between consumptionand
leisure in the same period is greater than or less than the intertemporaL
elasticity of substitution. For the special case where y, V-/V_l, and (9)
reduces to a simpler, more familiar forraila in which the growth rate of consump-
tion depends positively on the net rate of return and neatively on the pure
rate of tir preference, with the interteniporal elasticity of substitution
determining the sensitivity of the consumption profile to these other
parameters.
The correspondinb transition equation for leisure follows frou (8) an (9):




Itis straightforward to show that t/t_i is neatively(positively) related
tothe net marinal wage in period t (period t—i), reardless of the values of
pand .
Itis important to remember that equations (9) and (ii) determine the shape—13—
of the consumption and leisure profiles, not their absolute levels. In
general, no analytic solution for the actual values of C and 2.. is possible, and
valuesfor c and £ must be determined numerically.8
Two other tax systems examined here are progessive annual corisunition taxes
and progressive annual labor income taxes.(The proportional versions are spe-
cial cases.) For these two tax systems, suitable redefinitions of the budet
('D\4•,-4-- -- (n\ Q, - 1Oii. u I'.I• —LJ. we reuei J.ue .
effectivewage to be:
(7') w*=(wtet(1—T)+ 1.t) I(l+-rct)
where Twt is the marginal labor income tax and tct the marbinal consumption tax,
then condition (8)isa general expression for all tax systems, and condition
(9)becomes.
l+r l+T y V (') Ct= ( ( (_ ct—l )j(——) ct 1+6
l+tct vt_i
where v remains defined by (10). Again, while no analytical solution for c
and £ is normallypossible,a number of interesting points concerning these two
taxsystems are readily apparent. First, the "equivalence" between wage and
consumption taxes disappears when taxes are progressive or marginal tax rates
changeover time. Inparticular, a rising consumption profile normally leads to
arising marginal tax rate schedule under a progressive expenditure tax. As a
comparison of (9)and(9')indicates,this is equivalent to taxing the rate of—14—
return to savings. In general, the deree of pro6ressivity of any of the three
tax systems is just as important as the tax base in deterrainin economic
efficiency.
The Production Sector






whereY-, K andare output, capital and laborat timet,Ais a scaling
constant, s is the capital interisit' parameter (assumed throubhout the paper
equal to 0.25) and o is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor.Ltis simply equal to the sum of effective units of labor supply ofall
households. Kt is generated by a recursive equation that dictates that the
change in capital stock equals private plus public savinbs. Competitive beha-
vior onthe part of producers plus constant returns to scale in production
insure that the gross factor returns rt and wt are equated to the marinal pro-
ducts of capital and labor and that factor payments exhaust output. This is
sumnrized by:
1— (i/o)
(13a)wt/rt =( ) (Kt/Lt)
(l3b)rtKt +wtLt=—15—
This specification of production maces no allowance for technical change.
While productivity growth was incorporated by Auerbach and Kotlikoft (19b1) in
an earlier version of the model with fixed labor supply, it is impossible, in
general, to retain this element once labor supply is endogenous; the steady rise
of wage rates over time is not compatible with a steady state unless il, i.e.,
unless the utility function of contemporaneous consumption and leisure is
Cobb—Douglas.11 Such a restriction seems undesirable in the present context.
TheGovernmentSector
In this model the government's sole concern is the financing of a stream of
public expenditures, Gt, that grow at the samerateas population.12 For
simplicity, the impact of these expenditures on individual utility is ignored in
the analysis. Aside from various taxes, the government can issue one—period
debt to help finance current expenditures; such debt is a perfect substitute for
capital in household portfolios. If Dt is defined as the value of government's
debt (taking a negative value if there is a national surplus), government tax
revenue at the end of period t is:
(i1) ='tLwtLt
+rt(Kt+Dt)j+•tctCt+
where and are aggregate average tax rates on income, consumption,
and waes, respectively, calculated as weihted averages of individual averae
tax rates and C. is agreate consumption. Given the government's ability to
issue and retire debt, its bud5et constraint relates the present value of its—16—
value of its expenditures plus the value of its initial debt to the present
value of its tax receipts.
t cOt
(15) I (l+r5)1 Rt = L (l+rs)jlGt ÷ D0 t0 s0 t=O s0
Solution of the Model
Determination of the econon's dynamic equilibrium behavior begins with a
characterization of the initial steady state. The next step is to solve for the
econonr's transition to the new steady state that results froic the adoption of a
new policy or sequence of policies. It is important to reiaeiaber that the tran-
sition described is the one the econonr would actually take if all adents had
perfect foresi6ht.
After specification of the tax structure and level of national debt in the
initial steady state, solution for this steady state proceeds using a
Gauss—Seidel iteration technique. The algorithm requires initial guesses of the
aggregate supplies of capital, K, and labor, 1, also needed are initial guesses
for the labor supply multipliers, i,andthe marginal and average tax rates
faced by individuals of each age. Startiri, from these initial values, the
iteration produces new estimates used to update the guesses. This procedure is
repeated until a fixed point is reached. Given the nature of the algorithm,
such a fixed point corresponds to a steady—state equilibrium.
Though the iteration routine is slightly different for each type of tax—11—
system, the followin description of the procedure used for a progressive income
tax is illustrative of the general methodolo that applies to other tax systems
as well. A schematic representation is provided in Figure 1. Substitution of
the initial guesses for K and L into the marinal productivity conditions (13)
yields values for the gross returns w and r. Combination of these with initial
guesses of the tax rates and labor supply multipliers allows a solution for the
life—cycle consumption and leisure plans of the representative individual, c and
£, usinb equations (2), (8)and(9). From the definitions of savinbs and labor,
this yields the age—asset supply profile, labelled A and the age—labor supply
profile, H, which maybeagregated to provide new values of the overall
supplies of capital (subtractinb from agregate assets any national debt assumed
to exist) and labor, respectively. The asset and labor supply profiles, alonb
with the initial guesses of w and r, also provide a solution for the age—income
profile which, in turn, dictates the general level at which taxes must be set
(typically one parameter is varied in the tax function) to satist the government
budget constraint and, hence, determines new values of marinal and averaee tax rates
faced over the life cycle, ana , respectively. New values for the
multipliers, , are derived from the estimated labor supply profile. If the
computed value of 9 is less than l,1.i t is set to zero. If the computed value
of Lb exceeds one, thereby violatin6 the constraint, iitis set at the value
that, ceteris paribus, would have led to a value of 9 exactly equal to one.
Once these new values for K, L, , Iandiiarecalculated, they are used
to update the previous guesses, and a new iteration step beins. When the ini-











































































































































Solution for the econolivts equilibrium transition path proceeds in a similar
manner. However, because the econonr undergoes a transition with conditions
changing over time, it is necessary to solve explicitly for behavior in each
year. Moreover, because households are assumed to take account of future prices
in determining their behavior, it is necessary to solve simultaneously for
equilibrium in all transition years. This is done in the followinb way. the
simulation model provides the econo1cr with 150 years to reach a new steady
state. After 150 years, the model constrains all prices, tax rates, and labor
suply multipliers to be constant.-3 Again, the path of national debt is
specified, and initial guesses are provided for the values of K, L, i., tyand
for each of the 150 transition years.1 Based on these initial guesses, new
guesses are generated until a fixed point is reached. The procedure is similar
to that depicted in Figure 1forthe initial steadystate.Aside from the
greater complexity of solving simultaneously for equilibrium in 150 years, the
major difference in solving for the transition path as opposed to the initial
steady state is that individuals alive at the time the policy is adopted must be
treated differently. While individuals born after the transition begins know
the prices that will confront them, those born before the beginning of the tran-
sition behave up to the timeofthe charie in government policy as if the old
steady state would continue forever. At the time of the announcement of a new
policy to be instituted either immediately or in the near future, existing
cohorts are "born again," they behave like members of the new generations except
their horizon is less than fifty—five years, and they possess initial assets as
a result of prior accumulation.-5—20—
Parameterization of the Model
To solve the model, it is necessary to choose values for the preference
parameters, 6, a, p and y, the production elasticity a, the production scaling
constant, A, and the human capital vector, e.
The human capital vector determines relative wages by age. The profile used
inthis paper iscalculated from a cross—section regression of weekly labor ear-
nings of full—time workers on personal variables inciudin experience and
experience squared, reported by Welch (1979).16 The resulting wage profile
peaks at age 30, with wages at that age L5 percent higher than at age one. The
age 55 wage is 22 percent smaller than the age one wage.
For our basic parameterization, we set l, thereby assuming a Cobb—Douglas
production function. There has been a considerable amount of research into the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in U.S. manufacturing (see,
for example, Nerlove 1967, Berndt and Christensen 1973) with the general
finding that a<l, however, only a few studies have been able to reject the
hypothesis that 1.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution between goods (or leisure) in
different periods, y, has also been the subQect of a number of studies, most
focusing on consumption. Weber (1970) estimated y to lie between .13 and .141.
In a later study (Weber 1975), he found a range of y from .56to.75. bre—21—
recently, Grossman and Shiller (1980) estimated y to lie between .01 and .35,
and Hall (1981) found values generally below .1. In a study of both leisure and
consumption, Ghez and Becker (1915) estimated y to be at most .28. Based on
these studies, we choose a value of i=.25 for our basic sixmllations.11
There is little direct empirical evidence on the value of p, except for the
results of Ghez and Becker (1915), who find an aggregate value of p=.83. Much
evidence is available on the labor supply elasticities of both men and women
with respect to the contemporaneous wage, with "standard" values for the uncom-
pensated elasticity equal to near zero for men and at least one for married
women (see, for example, Heckinan 191, Rosen 1916, MaCurdy 1980 and Hausman
1981b). However, the translation of these elasticities into estimates of
p depends on the deree to which the underlying wabe changes are permanent or
temporary, and whether they are anticipated or unanticipated. A detailed
discussion of this issue is provided in the appendix. While a raribe of values
seems plausible for p, .8 seems to be a reasonable comprorndse. Moreover, this
value of p provides realistic age.-earnings and age—consumption profiles in our
simulation of the initial steady state. For lower values of p, consumption
growth is too high in later years and retirement does not occur. For higher
values, consumption actually declines during retirement. These effects occur
because leisure is relatively cheaper in later years (e declines); the greater
the elasticity of substution, p, the greater the shift from consumption into
leisure (see (8)).—22—
The leisure intensity parameter, a, and the scaling constant, A, really
depend on the choice of labor and output units. For convenience, we always
choose output units so that the wage in the initial steady state is unity for
age one individuals. This determines A. Adopting the convention of a labor
endowment equal to 5000 hours per year, we choose ci so that prime age labor
supply is about 2000 hours per year, or Lohoursper week. This suggests a
value of cl.5, which is used in all simulations. Finally, there is scant
empirical evidence on the appropriate value of 5.Since an increase in 5 would
reduce the steepness of consumption and leisure profiles (see (9) and (ii)), it
would lead to less saving and hence a lower capital—output ratio as well as a
smaller likelihood of retirement in later years. We find that setting .0l5
gives realistic values both for the capital—output ratio and the age of
retirement. Lowering 5 eliriiinates retirement, while raising it makes the
capital—output ratio unreasonably low.
The exact values of the key substitution elasticities remain uncertain.
Hence, we also present simulation results for different values of a, i and p.
The aim of this paper is not, however, to calculate exact estimates or the effi-
ciency gains or losses resulting from particular policies, but rather to reach
certain qualitative conclusions about the differences amon, alternative
policies.
Basic Simulation Results
The initial fiscal structure used as the starting point for most simulations
is a proportional income tax of 30 percent, with no national debt. The
parameterization outlined above generates an initial, long—run equilibrium
with a capital—output ratio of 3.014 and a gross interest rate of 8.22 percent.—23—
Retirement occurs at age 53, with labor supply peaking at a value of (23Lw
hours per year) at age 9. The solid and dashed lines in Figure 2 depict,
respectively, the age—consumption and age—earnings profiles in this initial
steady state. The age—consumption profile rises slowly over time, nearly
levelling off before retirement. Earnings rise until age 20 and then begin to
fall off. This drop in earnings becomes more rapid after age 30 as a result of
the combination of lower labor supply and a decline in wages. The sudden jump
in consumption during retirement results as a spillover from the retirement
constraint placed on the individual's purchase of leisure.
Starting from this long—run equilibrium, we calculate the path of the eco—
nonv to a new long—run equilibrium after the immediate adoption of either a pro-
portional consumption tax or a proportional wabe tax, with annual budbet balance
imposed in each year. Figure 3 presents the effects on cohort welfare of these
two potential chanes in tax re,ime. The various cohorts alive during the
econorrw's transition are identified on the vertical axis by their year of birth,
taking zero to be the year of the initiation of the tax change. Welfare gains
and losses are measured on the vertical axis as the fraction of full lifetime
labor endowment required under the original income tax regime to generate the
same level of utility actually achieved with the change in tax regime. For
example, a value of 1.02 means that a cohort's utility is increased as a result
of the tax change by the same amount as would have been induced by a 2 percent
increase in human capital endowment under the income tax. We refer to these
measures, as "wealth equivalents." The dashed line in Figure 3 represents the
wealth equivalents under a transition to a consumption tax; the dotted line




























































































































































































































































































As the diagram clearly demonstrates, the consequences for the distribution
of cohort welfare are narkedly different under these two alternative "tax
reforms." Along the consumption tax transition path, young and future cohorts
achieve substantial utility gains, partly at the expense of older cohorts. The
long—run steady state gain is over 6 percent under the consumption tax. Under
the wage tax, older cohorts gain, while generations either young or unborn at
the time of the policy switch are hurt. There is eventually a steady state
welfare loss of almost 14 percent. Interestingly, the identity of gainers and
losers under the two rebimes is aliuost exactly opposite. Those above the age of
about 18 at the time of the policy chane gain from a wae tax and lose from a
consumption tax, while all subsequent cohorts gain from a consumption tax and
lose from a wage tax.
The shapes of these curves are readily understood. Under the corisuniption
tax, elderlycohorts are faced with a muchheavier tax burden than they would
haveexperienced under the income tax. For these older cohorts, labor earnings
are small, and consumption is financed by depleting accumulated savings. Thus,
consumption far exceeds earnings, and the base of theconsumption tax is far
greaterthan that of the income tax. Young and future cohorts gain froma
switchto a consumption tax because older cohorts have been forced to bear a
largerportion of the present value of government expenditures.
The switch to a proportional wage tax raises the welfare of the elderly for
much the same reason that a consumption tax lowers it. Here, taxes on capital
income that would have been due under the income tax are eliminated. However,
these gains must be supported by a greater tax collection from young and future—27-
generations.
Despite the very different effects these two tax regimes have on steady
state welfare, both lead to a greater capital—output ratio by exemptinb capital
income from taxation and hence encouraging savings. Under a consumption tax,
which has a steady state value of 0.395, the capital output ratio rises so much,
from 3.0L to li..38, that the net—of—tax interest rate actually falls, from 5.15
percent (0.7x8.22) to 5.11 percent. Under a wage tax, which equals 0.ll in the
new steady state, the capital—output ratio rises less, to 3.5. Because of
this smaller rise in capital accumulation, the gross interest rate falls less,
to a value of 7,25 percent.
The results of these differences in interest rates, as well as the differen-
tial impact on welfare, may be seen by comparing the steady—state age—earnins
and age—consumption profiles under the consumption and wage taxes with those
in Figure 2 that occur under an income tax. Figure L presents the long—run age—
earnins profiles for the consumption tax (dashed line), wage tax (dotted line)
and income tax (solid line, reproduced from Figure 2). Because of the higher
equilibrium capital intensity, the wa,e rate is higher under a consumption tax
than under a wage tax (1.129 versus 1.043); this is reflected in the fact that
the age—earnings profile for the consumption tax lies entirely above that of the
wage tax. Because of the higher net interest rates under the wage tax, labor



































































































































































The age—consumption profiles shown in Figure5reflecta similarstory.
Consumptionrises most steely under a wage tax. The profile under a consump-
tion tax is much higher than those of the other two tax systeius because of the
higher wage rates achieved by individuals under this regime.
These results beg the question of whether policies that increase capital
accumulation also increase economic efficiency. Since some generations gain and
some 1OSCundereach of the tax changes considered thus far, some method is
necessary to isolate the substantial intergenerational transfers associated with
"taxreforms" like these from an inherent gains in efficiency associated with
these policies. One approach,explored by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981), is to
seekcombinations of wage and consumption taxes and deficit policy that raise
theutility of all cohorts to at least the level enjoyed under the income tax.
However, such "Pareto welfare paths" cannot offer an exact measure of the effi-
ciency gain (or loss) resulting I roxu a tax change. The next section presents a





























































































































































































































III.Distinguishing Efficiency from Redistribution: The Lump Sum Redistribution
Authority (LSRA)
TheLS1A is a hypothetical construct used to measure the pure efficiency
gains from tax reform. The LSRAismodelled as a separate, self—financin
goverment agency that uses lumpsum taxesand transfers to keep cohorts born
before a specified date at their status quo level of utility, and to raise the
utility of all cohorts born after this date by a uniform amount. Maximization
of the ininirnnm level of utility of those born after a certain date, a policy
analyzed in a two—period setting by Phelps and Riley (1978), seems to be a 1oi—
cal way of characterizing the infinite set of welfare paths the LSRA could
generate.18
The siimfiation model was adapted to solve for the economy's general
equilibrium transition path consistent with the behavior of the standard govern-
ment fiscal authority as well as the lump sum tax—transfer activity of the
LSRA. Thus, for example, household consumption decisions under a consumption
tax transition take account of the LSRA lump—sumtaxesand transfers. It is
alsoimportant to note that the equilibrium path of consumption tax rates will
differ from that generated in the absence of the LSHA,sincechanges in the
behaviorof households will necessitate modifications in the tax schedule
imposedby the main government authority.
TheLSRA faces a budget constraint requirin that the total value of its
lump—sumtaxes and transfers sum tozero in present value,Atany point in
time,the LSRA holds net assts that may be positive or negative, but that equal—32—
the present value of its net future payments. These net assets are added to
those held by the private sector to determine the econoxis total stock of
capital.
Lump sum taxes and transfers are collected and paid in year one (the first
year of the transition) for all existin cohorts and in the first year of econo-
mic life for all subsequent cohorts. Equation (16)exressesthe LSRA budet
constraint, where v is the lumpsum tax(nebative, if a transfer) paidbymem-
bers of generations born in year i, and n is the econoxrr's population growth rate.
The two pieces of the expression in (16) correspond, respectively, to the net
taxes collected from existin8 and future cohorts.
0 i
(16) 2.(1-i-n)1v1+ 2.(l+n)hj ii(l+rj)Ivi
=0
i=1 j=l
The method of simulation is essentially the same as that previously
described. However, the budget constraints of existing and future cohorts now
include the terms v1, and updated guesses of these imist be made in each itera-
tion step a1on with those of factor prices, tax rates and shadow wages. In the
first iteration of the simulation, all vi's are given preliminary values of
zero. In the course of each iteration, the model produces new estimates of the
path of this vector v. A weihted average of the initial guess and this com-
puted path generates a guess for the next iteration.—33-.
Thecalculationof v in each step, described in detail in the appendix, pro-
ceeds as follows. Under the assumption that all prices and tax rates are fixed,
the transfers necessary to insure cohorts born before i the oriinal steady
state level of utility are calculated; in the samefashion,we calculate the
transfers required by all future cohorts as functions vi(u*) of the unknown new
level of utility that prevails after i, u. We then take the present value of
all taxes and transfers, which is also a function of u*, set this equal tozero,
and solve for u* and hence the transrers for i >i.
Fi6ures 6 and 7,respectively,present the efficiency effects, as measured
from the LSHAsimulations,of moving from a proportional income tax to a propot—
tional consumption or wae tax. The original cohort welfare paths without the
LSRA are reproduced from Figure 3 (as solid lines in Figures 6 and 7) for
comparison. The dashed lines in each figure correspond to the welfare paths
achieved for the LSRA critical date i equal to 1 and 20.
Starting in year one, the efficiency gains from switchin to a proportional
consumption tax are sufficient to raise the wealth of all future generations by
1.73 percent without harming the welfare of earlier generations. Delaying the
gains until i =20allows a per cohort gain of about 5 percent. While
substantial, these gains are smaller than those achieved in the steady state
without the LSRA, because the heavy tax burden levied on the elderly startin in
year zero has been undone.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































The sustainable level of utility for i*=l is 2.33 percent below what it would
have been under the income tax. Delay of the loss until i*20 leads to a drop
of almost 9 percent in full lifetime resources for all future generations.
This difference between the sustainable levels of utility at i*1 under the
alternative tax regimes is remarkably large in liht of the apparent similarity
of the regimes themselves. Taking account of the fact that the present value of
full lifetime resources is approximately four times as large as lifetime ear—
nings for our simulations of the initial incote tax, the 1.73 percent gain under
the consumption tax and 2.33 percent loss under the wage tax represents a swing
of about 16.25 percent of lifetime earnings. Except for the difference between
the population growth rate and the individual rate of discount, this is also a
measure of the annual loss as a fraction of total labor income. For the U.S.
econoxx in 1980, total wage and salary compensation was 1,314k billion dollars19,
16.25 percent of which is 218 billion dollars, or about one—third the size of
the federal government's budget.
The key to this difference lies in the pattern of tax burden each new system
imposes on different generations. Aside from the differences in distributional
impact, which the LSRAneutralizes,the tax systems also differ in their excess
burden because they tax different generations at different marginal rates. A
consumption tax places high marginal tax rates on the elderly who, because they
have few years over which to alter their consumption—leisure decisions, exhibit
relatively inelastic behavior with respect to tax—induced changes in net prices.
This allows a lower burden, and, consequently, lower distortionary marginal tax—31—
rates, to be placed on those with a more elastic response, the young. The wage
tax does just the opposite, giving low marginal tax rates to the elder, paid
for through higher distortionary taxes on the young. It is thus crucial to the
efficiency gain resulting from a consumption tax that the initial generations
face high marginal tax rates.
IV. Sensitivity Analysis of Efficiency Gains
As stressed in section II, the parameters chosen for the baseline siimii-a—
tions are subject to a great deal of uncertaint. It is important to examine
the sensitivity of our results to changes in such parameters. Table 1 presents
the sustainable inaxiinin wealth effects (for i*=i) of movements from a propor-
tional income tax to proportional consumption and wage taxes for alternative
values of p, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods and
leisure,,theinterteraporal elasticity of substitution, and a, the elasticity
oftechnical substitution between capital and labor.
For the wage tax, the results are quite sensitive to parameter changes, but
indirections that intuition would dictate. Lowering y, and, hence, the distor-
tions associated with taxes on capital income, worsens the effects of going to a
wage tax. Reducing y from .25 to .1 increases the welfare loss from 2.33 per-
cent to 6.71k percent at c.8. Decreasing p, and, hence, the distortions asso-















.25 .03 —2.33 1
a
.25 .8—39—
reduction of p to .3 is sufficient to neutralize the negative impact of the wage
tax. Changing a to .8 reduces the effect of the change in regime, since gross
factor prices change more as a result of initial chanes in factor supplies,
thus making the general equilibrium changes in net prices, as well as associated
behavioral responses, smaller.20
In contrast, the efficiency effects of moving to a consumption tax appear
much less sensitive to the preference paramters p and y, though the effect of' a
change in a still appears important. To explain this result, it is helpful to
recall why the consumption tax is more efficient than the wage tax in the first
place. The consumption tax may be thought of as the combination of a wa,e tax
plus a levy on the initial elderly population. Though these elderly individuals
are relatively inelastic in their behavior, they can shift away from the con-
sumption tax to a certain extent, by shifting resources to periods when the con-
sumption tax may be lower (it is highest in the first year of the transition,
and then declines steadily until the new steady state is reached). The extent
to whicn they will do this depends on y, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. The higher is y, the more they will shift and the less like a
lump sum tax will be the initial levy on the elderly. Thus, the rise in y makes
the wage tax relatively more efficient, compared to the income tax, but it also
reduces the efficiency advantage of the consumption tax over the wae tax.—40—
V. The Progressive Tax: Efficiency Gains from Switching to Alternative Tax
Structures
Additional distortions are introduced with the probressivity of tax rates.
It is important to see how the results of the previous section are influenced by
allowing marginal and averae tax rates to differ.
For each of the tax structures, marginal tax rates are determined by the
following formula
(ii) t ='f'O+
whereB is the tax base, either annual income, annual consumption or annual
labor earnings. It follows that the average tax rates corresondinb to (iT) are
(la) ='if0 +
Asexplained in section II, each cohort in each transition year faces a dif-
ferent path of marginal and average tax rates, because of differences in beha-
vior and differences in the tax schedule parameters 'i'J and These rates are
solved for in each iteration step alon with factor prices and shadow waes (see
Figure 1).
To investigate reform of the proressive income tax, we specify an initial
steady state with =.22and =.2bfor the income tax. This yields a
profile of average tax rates that ranges from .2i2 at age 1 to .323 at age 26 to
a minimum of .227 at age 55, and is concentrated around .30, the level of pro——l1—
portional income tax considered above. The mar6inal rates range from .234 to
.L26. The first experiment involves switching from this regime to a propor-
tional income tax (roughly equal to .23 in the long run) to evaluate the excess
burden due to the progressivity of the income tax. The sustainable welfare gain
is larger than any of those reported in Table 1, equalling 6.15 percent of the
lifetime resources. The size of this distortion may seem somewhat surprising,
given the relatively small gap between marginal and average tax rates in the
initial steady states. However, it must be remembered that, for any single tax,
the magnitude of the distortion rises roughly in proportion to the square of the
marginal tax rate. Moreover, a further efficiency loss is introduced here by
the variation in marginal tax rates over time. Shifting to either a propor-
tional consumption tax or a proportional wage tax also leads to a large welfare
gain (1.O3 percent and 4.2L percent, respectively) although, as before, the wage
tax is inferior to the proportional income tax, while the consumption tax is
superior, however, it may be more appropriate to compare the progressive income
tax with alternative taxes possessing a similar degree of progressivity. To do
this, we choose values offorthe alternative tax bases that give top margi-
nal rates having roughly the same proportion to overall average rates as is the
case for the income tax. For exaxiple, the progressive income tax resulting from
=.22 and l'i=.25 yields a top marginal rate of O.13 compared to an overall
average rate of about .3.In our previous simulations for proportional taxes,
we had a consumption tax of .39 in the new steady state versus a wage tax of
.l. Thus, we seek top marinal rates of about .55 and .5b, respectively.These outcomes are rouhly achieved by 'lfi=.6 for the consumption tax and 'l=.4
for the wage tax.21 The values of '1 depend on the size of theannual tax
bases;in the steady state, they equal .24 and .32, respeCtively.
Transition from a probressive income tax to a consumption tax with
stillresults in a substantial efficiency gain of !.97 percent.However,the
switch to a wae tax produces a loss of 3.l percent, this loss is even larber
than the loss of 2.i3 percent occurin with a switch uricter proortiona.L
taxation.
To summarize these results, a truly probressive incoue tax is substantially
more distortionary than a proportional income tax. If probressive taxationmust
be used (for distributional obectives, presumably), the general efficiency
results from the study of proportional taxation carry over. A transition to a
consumption tax is considerably more efficient than a transition to a wage tax;
the first generates a lare efficiency gain while the second induces an equally
large efficiency loss.—4 3—
VI. Conclusions
The simulations presented above suest that a shift to a wabe tax from an
inconie tax can sibnificantly reduce economic efficiency. While a consumption
taxdoes offer efficiency gains, these arise chiefly froni the placement
(probably implausible, politically) of lare niarinal tax burdens on the relati-
vely inelasticelderly when capital income taxes are reduced. Foreboin such
taxeson the elderly effectively removes the distinction between a consumption
tax and a wage tax. While wage taxation will also stimulate capital foruation,
itmayreduceeconomic efficiency. Thus, it is inortant that policy makers not
confuse proramsthat stimulate capital formation with those that increase
welfare.
The paper also points out tiat the proressivity of a tax ma be at least as
iuortantas the tax base itself in determining the efficiency of the tax
systeni.-j44—
ppendix
Some of the results reported in the text are derived below.
Progressive Income Taxes















whereis as defined in (5)andJ. is the indirecteffect of Ctonthe budet
constraintthroubh chanes in the average tax rates T55, lettinM5,














Notethat assets at the beinnin of year s must equal the present value of
planned consumption less planned earninbs over the years s through 55,i.e.
55 x
(A'i.) A =).Iit (i+r1(i1))H-
x=sz=s
we can simplify (A3):
(A5) =_Lit(1+rz(i_yz)fll[w5e5(15)+r5A5j =— —
IFTy(.) is the progressive income tax function, then tyS=Ty(ys)/ysand Tys =
Ty'(y5).Thus,
T' (y6)T(y5) dy =(Tys
—
Tys) (A6) = ( —— _____
dct y5 y5 dc Ysdct
Thus,from (A5) and (A6),
S












(AlO) —= { dct
dct —1 s=t—T —







which, soived recursively, yields:
dA5 s—i
(ii2) —= — 11(1+r(i_'c.)) dCt z=t+i
and, using (AT) and (As),
S s—i





















=I(i+rz(1—z)h1 (1- iTZ(Z )
z=1 zt+1 (1+r(1_)
Substitution of (A15) into (Al) yields condition (la). Condition (4b) is
derived by an analaous method.
Progressive Consumption and Wage Taxation
Maximization of the Laranian
1— 1
( ?)
(A16)(1)) L(i+o)(t-1) (c(1 +
1-
55t
+A) Ir (1+r)1l{[(1_.)wtet +1(i—&.)
—(1+c)ct}
t1 s=2
with respect to Ctyields:—19—
1 — dr
(A16)(1+6)_(t_1) = it(1+rs)1l[(1_Tct) +
dCt
t
= it(1+r3)'(1+T ) s2
t
usirxthe definitions of T.andr...The first—order condition for Z is: — I-t
(pu)(1÷)-(t-l) = AL it(1+rs)l[(1_Twt)wtet ++ wtet(1-)]
t
Alit (1+r5)]—l [(1_twt)wtet +
s=2
using the definitions of and Dividin (All) by (A16) and using the
definition of wt* in (7')yields(8).Substitutionof (8) into (A16) yields
1 1
(A18) (1+6)_(t_1) ct? 't?A[ it (l+rs)1l(1+Tct)
s=2
which,combined for successive values of t, yields equation (9').
LSRA Transfers
Because the utility function described in (1) is homothetic, increases in indi-
vidual wealth, given fixed prices, bring about proportional increases in the
vectors cand £.Thus,to solve for the additional resources needed by an mdi——50—










whereu is the current level of utility bein attained with a transfer level V1.
Thedifference between vi and the product of 4andthe present value of earuins
yields a guess of the additional resources, that xmist be transferred to the
individual to attain the utilit' level u. Addinb to v gives us a function
vi(u) of total transfers needed for utility level u.
For individuals alive when the transition begins, the same procedure is followed
using the utility subfurictions that apply over the remaining years of life.
For individuals of cohorts i. <*, uis set at the level that would have been
enjoyed under the original tax regime, u0. The present value, T, of all such
transfers, v(u0), i<i*, is then calculated. The value of u' is chosen by
asswiiin that the present value of all LSRA transfers is zero:
(A21) T+
[(i÷rj)i (i+n) vi(u*) =0
i=ij=O—51—
This also yields solutions for Vj(U*), the new guesses for Vj, which are
weighted with the old vector v to provide values for the next iteration.
Estimatingfrom Labor Supply Elasticities
It is difficult to recover values of p from empirical labor supply estima-
tes without making assuniptioris about whether observed wage changes are permanent
or temporary, and how far in advance, if at all, they are anticipated by the
individual workers. picafl, all we have is an estimate of the uncompensated
elasticity of labor supply with resect to the conteluporaneous wage. Thoubh
some authors do calculate "compensated" elasticities, it is not always clear
that the compensation experiment is in accoraance with the nature of the wage
change. In short, the size of the income effect is crucial to calculatin P,
but it may be hard to identify.
Consider an experiment where an individual worker has his wage increased
equiproportionajly from date t1 until date t2. Suppose, further, that the
worker becomes aware of the prospective change at date t0 < t1. If t0 =1,
perfect foresight prevails. If t0 =t1,the change is entirely unanticipated.
Using equations (2) ,(8), (9)and (10) in the text and (ALt) in the appendix,
we may solve for the individual's labor supply in terms of assets held at time
to, which are fixed by assumption, and all relevant prices after date t0. For
thesimple case without taxes and with interest rates constant over time, this







23) Et0 =. (i+r) wt*
t=to
is the present valueofearnings beginin in periodtoand
55 —(i—y)(t—t0) —y(t—t0)





For simplicity, we assume that, initially, wt* is the same for allt,and con-
sider a unit increase in all waes between t1 and t2. From(A22),thisyields:
(p26 = [-pf(Et0)1 +jaPw*(1)
dw* w At0+Et0 i+Pw*(l_p)
where is that part of Et0 occurring between dates t1 and t2, and Xt0 is
definedanalagously with respect to Xt0.
Using (8)andthe fact that labor supply in period t equals(i—h).wemay
solve(A26)forthe uncompensated labor supply elasticity, TI,inperiod t1and
then express p in texs of this elasticity—53





isthe expenditure share of consumption, constant over timebecauseof the
assumption ofinitiallyconstant w. If we ignore savings in period t, then
c =w*(l_9..)andz =(i—9)this allows us to rewrite (A27) as
n 1 Et X. () p(_) - + —-- — -
l••&t]l& A0+E
The last term in (A29)hastwo components that depend on how big, in present
value terms, the interval is between t1 and t2 relative to that between t0 and
55. They each become smaller as either t2 is decreased (the wage increase
becomes more temporary) or t0 is decreased (the wae increase is anticipated
further in advance). In each case the income effect on period t1 labor supply
is reduced, since eitner total wealth increases by less or anticipation of the
wage increase allows increased purchases in the period s before t1. The two
extreme cases are when the tax increase is permanent and unanticipated (t0t1
t2=55) and when it is veryshortor anticipated (t2t1, t0<<t1). These two
casesyield respective expressions for p, based on (A29).ctr=u  .io;  pu 
OJ  JO  TA  trtqo  t  'çTo  pU  O.=-'  '0tq.  '5TO  T 
JT  'T1X  .XO  JTT  TBTXTCIIU  JOJ  pu  O  jo  nTA 
p-rop  .srim  ai  sq1,  aq.  sooqo  o  'JM1Ofl  o 
tUO.1J  T  'iffJ  J°  1TA  'Tq  TTTT  iO  e  pU  00 
uiq  jo  d  Jo  9UJ  '  uTqo  '(suOTTnuJTs  .XflO  UT  TflpTATpuT  —TppT 
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Footnotes
1 Chamley (1981a, 1981b) and Black (1981) emphasize this point in discussing tax
efficiency for infinite horizon economies.
2See Summers(1981) or Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981) for further discussion.
3 See Auerbach (1919b) for r:urther discussion.
4LettinLi, ,C1 andc2 be leisure and consumption in the first and second
periods, respectively, a utility function of theformu(Li, 9, (c1, c2)),
whereis homogenous, would normally callfor a uniform tax on ciand C2plus
atax on second period labor supply, assuming first period labor to be
untaxed. Even if utility was of the form u( 1,L),(c1,c2)) with both and
homogenous, a pure consumption tax woud not be called for, it is homoge-
neity in labor rather than leisure that wouldsufficefor such a result.
5Auerbachand Kotlikoff (1981) examine issues arising from intragenerational
differences in ability, and intergenerational differences due to technological
change. As discussed below, both of these extensions would be difficult to
maintain in the current model and are not directly relevant to the questions
being addressed.
6For1, the use of 1'Hopital's Rule yields:
Il\ I1\ u(c,)=[1) L(1÷(t_1) 1og(c' p' +LQ) t=l
p—56—
For p= 1, 1—
55 ( (J:_) (___) y
u(c,&) (— )L (1+)_t_hI (Ct 1++l+ci
l-
7The derivation of this and of further results in this section is provided in
the appendix.
8 It is not possible to obtain an analytical solution for the absolute level of
consumption and leisure for the following reason. successive application of
(9) yields an expression for ct in terms of c1, from () and the budet
constraint (2), c1 can be solved in terms of net average and marinal factor
returns and labor endowments, given c1, (8) and (9), one can solve for all
other values of ct and £..However,this procedure would yield an analytical
solution for the consumption and leisure profiles c and £ only if net factor
returns actually were exoenous. There are two reasons why this is not the
case. First, under a probressive tax system, tax rates are function of the
vectors cand £.Second,even with proportional taxes, the multipliers l.Lt
maydepend on the labor supply decision. Thus, the procedure just outlined
would amount to no more than a solution for c and £ in terms of some corapli—
cated nonlinear functions of c and £.
9See the appendix for a demonstration.
10 As is well—known, this specification reduces to Cobb—Douglas when l.—57—
In a steady state both and must be constant over successive genera-
tions for anyaet. However, from (8),
=-P (wt*)l_P(t )
wt*
so that these conditions cannot simultaneously be met, if there is general
wage growth, unless p1.
12 Note that Gtcorresponds to a different concept from that reported in the
National Income Accounts, which includes government purchases of capital
goods.
13 In actual simulations, converence always occurs well before year 150, so
these constraints are not binding. The solution technique merely requires
that some date be specified for the beginning of the final steady state.
i4 It is also possible to allow debt to be endoenous, anu tax rates exobenous.
For exai1e, instead of specifying the path of debt, one could specify the
path of taxrates for a certain number ofyears and solve for the debt path
consistentwith this. An exnp1eof such a simulation is presented in
Auerbachand Kotlikoff (1981)
15Thismethodoloy does not restrict ustoconsider only those policies where
existinggenerations are Itfooled, since we may specify that a policy change—5b—
begins, say, in year 50. The transition path beginsat the time a policy is
announced, not when it actually begins.
i6 The equation used, based on one reported by Welch (1979) for the earnings of
high school graduates, is et =)4.L7' + 0.033t—o.ooo6Tt2,where t is the
number of years of experience. We take t to equal the ae ofthe individual,
since, by our measure, adult life begins at t=1.
For a detailed survey of theempiricalevidence relevant for the choice of 1,
as well as other preferences parameters, see Skinner(19b1).
iS Because the LSkA is only a theoretical construct, there isstill a potential
problem, datin from the welfare analysis of Hicks(l99) and Kaldor (199),
in usin it to make a comparison between tax systems.The "maximin" level of
utilityachievedby cohorts born after one date might be higherunder tax
regime A than tax regime B, while if a different date werechosen, all sub—
sequent cohorts might do better under regime B.Unless one particular
redistriuutiOn scheme is actually carried out, theoretical"as if" conk-
parisons may yield ambiguous results.
19 U.S. Economic Report of the President, 1951, Table B—20.
20 This sensitivity to cv has been examined carefully by Chamley (l9blb).
21 The actual top marjnal rates that occur in the final steady state are 0.572
at age 55 for the consumption tax and 0.553 at agei6 for the wage tax.—59—
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